Quality target negotiation in health care: evidence from the English NHS

E. Fichera; Hugh Stanley Emrys Gravelle; M. Pezzino; M. Sutton

doi:10.1007/s10198-015-0723-8

Quality target negotiation in health care: evidence from the English NHS

E. Fichera, Hugh Stanley Emrys Gravelle, M. Pezzino, M. Sutton

Centre for Health Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We examine how public sector third-party purchasers and hospitals negotiate quality targets when a fixed proportion of hospital revenue is required to be linked to quality. We develop a bargaining model linking the number of quality targets to purchaser and hospital characteristics. Using data extracted from 153 contracts for acute hospital services in England in 2010/11, we find that the number of quality targets is associated with the purchaser’s population health and its budget, the hospital type, whether the purchaser delegated negotiation to an agency, and the quality targets imposed by the supervising regional health authority.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	811-822
Number of pages	12
Journal	European Journal of Health Economics
Volume	17
Issue number	2
Early online date	11 Sept 2015
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10198-015-0723-8
Publication status	Published - Sept 2016

Bibliographical note

© 2016 Springer International Publishing AG. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details

Keywords

Contracts
quality
financial incentives
pay for performance
hospitals
Nash bargaining.

Access to Document

10.1007/s10198-015-0723-8

EF HG MP MS Quality target negotiatn hlth care EJHE accepted 190815
© 2016 Springer International Publishing AG. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details
Accepted author manuscript, 659 KB

Cite this

@article{48e9705b2b2d40eaad006782733a8d55,

title = "Quality target negotiation in health care: evidence from the English NHS",

abstract = "We examine how public sector third-party purchasers and hospitals negotiate quality targets when a fixed proportion of hospital revenue is required to be linked to quality. We develop a bargaining model linking the number of quality targets to purchaser and hospital characteristics. Using data extracted from 153 contracts for acute hospital services in England in 2010/11, we find that the number of quality targets is associated with the purchaser{\textquoteright}s population health and its budget, the hospital type, whether the purchaser delegated negotiation to an agency, and the quality targets imposed by the supervising regional health authority.",

keywords = "Contracts, quality, financial incentives, pay for performance, hospitals, Nash bargaining.",

author = "E. Fichera and Gravelle, {Hugh Stanley Emrys} and M. Pezzino and M. Sutton",

note = "{\textcopyright} 2016 Springer International Publishing AG. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher{\textquoteright}s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details",

year = "2016",

month = sep,

doi = "10.1007/s10198-015-0723-8",

language = "English",

volume = "17",

pages = "811--822",

journal = "European Journal of Health Economics",

issn = "1618-7598",

publisher = "Springer",

number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Quality target negotiation in health care

T2 - evidence from the English NHS

AU - Fichera, E.

AU - Gravelle, Hugh Stanley Emrys

AU - Pezzino, M.

AU - Sutton, M.

N1 - © 2016 Springer International Publishing AG. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details

PY - 2016/9

Y1 - 2016/9

N2 - We examine how public sector third-party purchasers and hospitals negotiate quality targets when a fixed proportion of hospital revenue is required to be linked to quality. We develop a bargaining model linking the number of quality targets to purchaser and hospital characteristics. Using data extracted from 153 contracts for acute hospital services in England in 2010/11, we find that the number of quality targets is associated with the purchaser’s population health and its budget, the hospital type, whether the purchaser delegated negotiation to an agency, and the quality targets imposed by the supervising regional health authority.

AB - We examine how public sector third-party purchasers and hospitals negotiate quality targets when a fixed proportion of hospital revenue is required to be linked to quality. We develop a bargaining model linking the number of quality targets to purchaser and hospital characteristics. Using data extracted from 153 contracts for acute hospital services in England in 2010/11, we find that the number of quality targets is associated with the purchaser’s population health and its budget, the hospital type, whether the purchaser delegated negotiation to an agency, and the quality targets imposed by the supervising regional health authority.

KW - Contracts

KW - quality

KW - financial incentives

KW - pay for performance

KW - hospitals

KW - Nash bargaining.

U2 - 10.1007/s10198-015-0723-8

DO - 10.1007/s10198-015-0723-8

M3 - Article

SN - 1618-7598

VL - 17

SP - 811

EP - 822

JO - European Journal of Health Economics

JF - European Journal of Health Economics

IS - 2

ER -