Quantum tagging: Authenticating location via quantum information and relativistic signaling constraints

TY - JOUR

T1 - Quantum tagging

T2 - Authenticating location via quantum information and relativistic signaling constraints

AU - Kent, Adrian

AU - Munro, William J.

AU - Spiller, Timothy P.

PY - 2011/7/21

Y1 - 2011/7/21

N2 - We define the task of quantum tagging, that is, authenticating the classical location of a classical tagging device by sending and receiving quantum signals from suitably located distant sites, in an environment controlled by an adversary whose quantum information processing and transmitting power is unbounded. We define simple security models for this task and briefly discuss alternatives. We illustrate the pitfalls of naive quantum cryptographic reasoning in this context by describing several protocols which at first sight appear unconditionally secure but which, as we show, can in fact be broken by teleportation-based attacks. We also describe some protocols which cannot be broken by these specific attacks, but do not prove they are unconditionally secure. We review the history of quantum tagging protocols, and show that protocols previously proposed by Malaney and Chandran are provably insecure.

AB - We define the task of quantum tagging, that is, authenticating the classical location of a classical tagging device by sending and receiving quantum signals from suitably located distant sites, in an environment controlled by an adversary whose quantum information processing and transmitting power is unbounded. We define simple security models for this task and briefly discuss alternatives. We illustrate the pitfalls of naive quantum cryptographic reasoning in this context by describing several protocols which at first sight appear unconditionally secure but which, as we show, can in fact be broken by teleportation-based attacks. We also describe some protocols which cannot be broken by these specific attacks, but do not prove they are unconditionally secure. We review the history of quantum tagging protocols, and show that protocols previously proposed by Malaney and Chandran are provably insecure.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=79961103607&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1103/PhysRevA.84.012326

DO - 10.1103/PhysRevA.84.012326

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:79961103607

SN - 1050-2947

VL - 84

JO - Physical Review A

JF - Physical Review A

IS - 1

M1 - 012326

ER -