Realistic Threat Models for Satellite-Based Quantum Key Distribution

Masoud Ghalaii; Sima Bahrani; Carlo Liorni; Federico Grasselli; Hermann Kampermann; Lewis Wooltorton; Rupesh Kumar; Stefano Pirandola; Timothy P. Spiller; Alexander Ling; Bruno Huttner; Mohsen Razavi

doi:10.48550/arXiv.2212.04807

Realistic Threat Models for Satellite-Based Quantum Key Distribution

Masoud Ghalaii, Sima Bahrani, Carlo Liorni, Federico Grasselli, Hermann Kampermann, Lewis Wooltorton, Rupesh Kumar, Stefano Pirandola, Timothy P. Spiller, Alexander Ling, Bruno Huttner, Mohsen Razavi

Research output: Working paper › Preprint

Abstract

The security of prepare-and-measure satellite-based quantum key distribution (QKD), under restricted eavesdropping scenarios, is addressed. We particularly consider cases where the eavesdropper, Eve, has limited access to the transmitted signal by Alice, and/or Bob's receiver station. This restriction is modeled by lossy channels between Alice/Bob and Eve, where the transmissivity of such channels can, in principle, be bounded by monitoring techniques. An artefact of such lossy channels is the possibility of having bypass channels, those which are not accessible to Eve, but may not necessarily be characterized by the users either. This creates interesting, {\it unexplored}, scenarios for analyzing QKD security. In this paper, we obtain generic bounds on the key rate in the presence of bypass channels and apply them to continuous-variable QKD protocols with Gaussian encoding with direct and reverse reconciliation. We find regimes of operation in which the above restrictions on Eve can considerably improve system performance. We also develop customised bounds for several protocols in the BB84 family and show that, in certain regimes, even the simple protocol of BB84 with weak coherent pulses is able to offer positive key rates at high channel losses, which would otherwise be impossible under an unrestricted Eve. In this case the limitation on Eve would allow Alice to send signals with larger intensities than the optimal value under an ideal Eve, which effectively reduces the effective channel loss. In all these cases, the part of the transmitted signal that does not reach Eve can play a non-trivial role in specifying the achievable key rate. Our work opens up new security frameworks for spaceborne quantum communications systems.

Original language	English
Publisher	arXiv
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2212.04807
Publication status	Published - 9 Dec 2022

Bibliographical note

39 pages, 17 figures

Keywords

quant-ph

Access to Document

10.48550/arXiv.2212.04807

2212.04807v1

Cite this

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title = "Realistic Threat Models for Satellite-Based Quantum Key Distribution",

abstract = " The security of prepare-and-measure satellite-based quantum key distribution (QKD), under restricted eavesdropping scenarios, is addressed. We particularly consider cases where the eavesdropper, Eve, has limited access to the transmitted signal by Alice, and/or Bob's receiver station. This restriction is modeled by lossy channels between Alice/Bob and Eve, where the transmissivity of such channels can, in principle, be bounded by monitoring techniques. An artefact of such lossy channels is the possibility of having bypass channels, those which are not accessible to Eve, but may not necessarily be characterized by the users either. This creates interesting, {\it unexplored}, scenarios for analyzing QKD security. In this paper, we obtain generic bounds on the key rate in the presence of bypass channels and apply them to continuous-variable QKD protocols with Gaussian encoding with direct and reverse reconciliation. We find regimes of operation in which the above restrictions on Eve can considerably improve system performance. We also develop customised bounds for several protocols in the BB84 family and show that, in certain regimes, even the simple protocol of BB84 with weak coherent pulses is able to offer positive key rates at high channel losses, which would otherwise be impossible under an unrestricted Eve. In this case the limitation on Eve would allow Alice to send signals with larger intensities than the optimal value under an ideal Eve, which effectively reduces the effective channel loss. In all these cases, the part of the transmitted signal that does not reach Eve can play a non-trivial role in specifying the achievable key rate. Our work opens up new security frameworks for spaceborne quantum communications systems. ",

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author = "Masoud Ghalaii and Sima Bahrani and Carlo Liorni and Federico Grasselli and Hermann Kampermann and Lewis Wooltorton and Rupesh Kumar and Stefano Pirandola and Spiller, {Timothy P.} and Alexander Ling and Bruno Huttner and Mohsen Razavi",

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AU - Bahrani, Sima

AU - Liorni, Carlo

AU - Grasselli, Federico

AU - Kampermann, Hermann

AU - Wooltorton, Lewis

AU - Kumar, Rupesh

AU - Pirandola, Stefano

AU - Spiller, Timothy P.

AU - Ling, Alexander

AU - Huttner, Bruno

AU - Razavi, Mohsen

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N2 - The security of prepare-and-measure satellite-based quantum key distribution (QKD), under restricted eavesdropping scenarios, is addressed. We particularly consider cases where the eavesdropper, Eve, has limited access to the transmitted signal by Alice, and/or Bob's receiver station. This restriction is modeled by lossy channels between Alice/Bob and Eve, where the transmissivity of such channels can, in principle, be bounded by monitoring techniques. An artefact of such lossy channels is the possibility of having bypass channels, those which are not accessible to Eve, but may not necessarily be characterized by the users either. This creates interesting, {\it unexplored}, scenarios for analyzing QKD security. In this paper, we obtain generic bounds on the key rate in the presence of bypass channels and apply them to continuous-variable QKD protocols with Gaussian encoding with direct and reverse reconciliation. We find regimes of operation in which the above restrictions on Eve can considerably improve system performance. We also develop customised bounds for several protocols in the BB84 family and show that, in certain regimes, even the simple protocol of BB84 with weak coherent pulses is able to offer positive key rates at high channel losses, which would otherwise be impossible under an unrestricted Eve. In this case the limitation on Eve would allow Alice to send signals with larger intensities than the optimal value under an ideal Eve, which effectively reduces the effective channel loss. In all these cases, the part of the transmitted signal that does not reach Eve can play a non-trivial role in specifying the achievable key rate. Our work opens up new security frameworks for spaceborne quantum communications systems.

AB - The security of prepare-and-measure satellite-based quantum key distribution (QKD), under restricted eavesdropping scenarios, is addressed. We particularly consider cases where the eavesdropper, Eve, has limited access to the transmitted signal by Alice, and/or Bob's receiver station. This restriction is modeled by lossy channels between Alice/Bob and Eve, where the transmissivity of such channels can, in principle, be bounded by monitoring techniques. An artefact of such lossy channels is the possibility of having bypass channels, those which are not accessible to Eve, but may not necessarily be characterized by the users either. This creates interesting, {\it unexplored}, scenarios for analyzing QKD security. In this paper, we obtain generic bounds on the key rate in the presence of bypass channels and apply them to continuous-variable QKD protocols with Gaussian encoding with direct and reverse reconciliation. We find regimes of operation in which the above restrictions on Eve can considerably improve system performance. We also develop customised bounds for several protocols in the BB84 family and show that, in certain regimes, even the simple protocol of BB84 with weak coherent pulses is able to offer positive key rates at high channel losses, which would otherwise be impossible under an unrestricted Eve. In this case the limitation on Eve would allow Alice to send signals with larger intensities than the optimal value under an ideal Eve, which effectively reduces the effective channel loss. In all these cases, the part of the transmitted signal that does not reach Eve can play a non-trivial role in specifying the achievable key rate. Our work opens up new security frameworks for spaceborne quantum communications systems.

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