From the same journal

From the same journal

Regulation and access pricing: Comparison of regulated regimes

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Author(s)

  • G De Fraja
  • C W Price

Department/unit(s)

Publication details

JournalScottish Journal of Political Economy
DatePublished - Feb 1999
Issue number1
Volume46
Number of pages16
Pages (from-to)116
Original languageEnglish

Abstract

The statutory duties of regulators of British utilities include both the encouragement of competition and protection of consumers (through price caps). Competition depends on the terms on which new entrants can gain access to the monopolist's network. Where the incumbent in the retail market also owns the network, the regulator may determine prices in the capped and access markets separately or may make the price cap explicitly dependent on entry in the uncapped market. Contrary to the received wisdom that access charges should be separately regulated we show that higher welfare can be obtained in some circumstances by allowing the incumbent to determine access charges. This is achieved by permitting the incumbent to choose from a menu of retail prices which the regulator makes conditional on the extent of entry in the retail market.

    Research areas

  • COMPETITION

Discover related content

Find related publications, people, projects, datasets and more using interactive charts.

View graph of relations