TY - JOUR
T1 - Reject and Renegotiate
T2 - the Shapley value in multilateral bargaining
AU - Ju, Yuan
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - This paper investigates three distinctive and intuitive renegotiation bargaining protocols that all yield the Shapley value as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. These protocols, built on the multi-bidding procedure of Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), allow more freedom in multilateral bargaining where rejected players can further negotiate and form coalitions. The self-duality of the Shapley value plays a key role in the second and third results. Moreover, these renegotiation protocols allow an actual play along the equilibrium path to restore the Shapley value in case of a ‘mistake’ made before.
AB - This paper investigates three distinctive and intuitive renegotiation bargaining protocols that all yield the Shapley value as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. These protocols, built on the multi-bidding procedure of Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), allow more freedom in multilateral bargaining where rejected players can further negotiate and form coalitions. The self-duality of the Shapley value plays a key role in the second and third results. Moreover, these renegotiation protocols allow an actual play along the equilibrium path to restore the Shapley value in case of a ‘mistake’ made before.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84866656082&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.08.009
DO - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.08.009
M3 - Article
SN - 0304-4068
VL - 48
SP - 431
EP - 436
JO - Journal of Mathematical Economics
JF - Journal of Mathematical Economics
IS - 6
ER -