Relationism about Memory?

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I identify the particular kind of memory for which relationism is plausible. Recognition of the limited scope for a relationist theory is an important part of its assessment. I consider two arguments against relationism about memory each of which are also partly responsible for the tendency to see representational accounts of memory in non-relational terms. In answering these arguments, I create room for a relational theory of either type. I identify considerations against the non-representational version of relationism before developing the representational relationist alternative in more detail and noting its implications for the question of whether memory should be understood as part of a general faculty of mental time travel. I conclude that non-representational relationism about memory is unmotivated, the standard moves made by naïve realists to defend their position regarding perception don’t transfer easily to non-representational relationism about memory and, indeed, this approach to memory generates theoretical tensions for those who would be naïve realists about perception. It opens up an explanatory deficit in the naïve realist’s position. Representational relationism, on the other hand, avoids these difficulties and is in a good position to accommodate the various ways in which we may have sensuous memories.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationPhilosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination
EditorsAnja Berninger, Ingrid Vendrell Ferran
Place of PublicationNew York and London
Number of pages29
ISBN (Print)9780367708771
Publication statusPublished - 4 Nov 2022

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