Reproductive justice: Non-interference or non-domination?

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Reproductive justice : Non-interference or non-domination? / Bhakuni, Himani.

In: Developing World Bioethics, 16.05.2021.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Bhakuni, H 2021, 'Reproductive justice: Non-interference or non-domination?', Developing World Bioethics. https://doi.org/10.1111/dewb.12317

APA

Bhakuni, H. (2021). Reproductive justice: Non-interference or non-domination? Developing World Bioethics. https://doi.org/10.1111/dewb.12317

Vancouver

Bhakuni H. Reproductive justice: Non-interference or non-domination? Developing World Bioethics. 2021 May 16. https://doi.org/10.1111/dewb.12317

Author

Bhakuni, Himani. / Reproductive justice : Non-interference or non-domination?. In: Developing World Bioethics. 2021.

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@article{c4b7fe7f3957486aa60628a527179688,
title = "Reproductive justice: Non-interference or non-domination?",
abstract = "The reproductive justice movement started by black women's rights activists made its way into the academic literature as an intersectional approach to women's reproductive autonomy. While there are many scholars who now employ the term 'reproductive justice' in their research, few have taken up the task of explaining what 'justice' entails in reproductive justice. In this paper I take up part of this work and attempt to clarify the relevant kind of freedom an adequate theory of reproductive justice would postulate. To do so, I compare two approaches to reproductive freedom: an approach based on freedom as non-interference and an approach based on freedom as non-domination. I then argue that the non-domination approach better fits the ideals of the reproductive justice movement as set forth by its founders and should be treated as one of the necessary conditions in any non-ideal account of reproductive justice. Towards the end, I single out epistemic non-domination as crucial in shaping the narrative around reproductive justice.",
author = "Himani Bhakuni",
note = "{\textcopyright} 2021 The Authors. Developing World Bioethics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.",
year = "2021",
month = may,
day = "16",
doi = "10.1111/dewb.12317",
language = "English",
journal = "Developing World Bioethics",
issn = "1471-8731",
publisher = "Wiley",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) - Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - Reproductive justice

T2 - Non-interference or non-domination?

AU - Bhakuni, Himani

N1 - © 2021 The Authors. Developing World Bioethics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

PY - 2021/5/16

Y1 - 2021/5/16

N2 - The reproductive justice movement started by black women's rights activists made its way into the academic literature as an intersectional approach to women's reproductive autonomy. While there are many scholars who now employ the term 'reproductive justice' in their research, few have taken up the task of explaining what 'justice' entails in reproductive justice. In this paper I take up part of this work and attempt to clarify the relevant kind of freedom an adequate theory of reproductive justice would postulate. To do so, I compare two approaches to reproductive freedom: an approach based on freedom as non-interference and an approach based on freedom as non-domination. I then argue that the non-domination approach better fits the ideals of the reproductive justice movement as set forth by its founders and should be treated as one of the necessary conditions in any non-ideal account of reproductive justice. Towards the end, I single out epistemic non-domination as crucial in shaping the narrative around reproductive justice.

AB - The reproductive justice movement started by black women's rights activists made its way into the academic literature as an intersectional approach to women's reproductive autonomy. While there are many scholars who now employ the term 'reproductive justice' in their research, few have taken up the task of explaining what 'justice' entails in reproductive justice. In this paper I take up part of this work and attempt to clarify the relevant kind of freedom an adequate theory of reproductive justice would postulate. To do so, I compare two approaches to reproductive freedom: an approach based on freedom as non-interference and an approach based on freedom as non-domination. I then argue that the non-domination approach better fits the ideals of the reproductive justice movement as set forth by its founders and should be treated as one of the necessary conditions in any non-ideal account of reproductive justice. Towards the end, I single out epistemic non-domination as crucial in shaping the narrative around reproductive justice.

U2 - 10.1111/dewb.12317

DO - 10.1111/dewb.12317

M3 - Article

C2 - 33998120

JO - Developing World Bioethics

JF - Developing World Bioethics

SN - 1471-8731

ER -