Revelation and the Nature of Colour

Keith Malcolm Allen

doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01261.x

Revelation and the Nature of Colour

Keith Malcolm Allen

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

According to naïve realist (or primitivist) theories of colour, colours are sui generis mind-independent properties. The question that I consider in this paper is the relationship of naïve realism to what Mark Johnston calls Revelation, the thesis that the essential nature of colour is fully revealed in a standard visual experience. In the first part of the paper, I argue that if naïve realism is true, then Revelation is false. In the second part of the paper, I defend naïve realism against a number of objections.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	153-176
Number of pages	24
Journal	Dialectica
Volume	65
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01261.x
Publication status	Published - Jun 2011

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10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01261.x

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01261.x/abstract

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Revelation and the Nature of Colour

Abstract

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