Revisiting Maher’s One-Factor Theory of Delusion, Again

Ema Sullivan-Bissett*, Paul Noordhof

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Chenwei Nie ([22]) argues against a Maherian one-factor approach to explaining delusion. We argue that his objections fail. They are largely based on a mistaken understanding of the approach (as committed to the claim that anomalous experience is sufficient for delusion). Where they are not so based, they instead rest on misinterpretation of recent defences of the position, and an underestimation of the resources available to the one-factor theory.

Original languageEnglish
Article number17
Number of pages8
JournalNeuroethics
Volume17
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 3 Apr 2024

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s) 2024.

Keywords

  • anomalous experience
  • Delusion
  • one-factor
  • rationality
  • two-factor

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