Risk-sharing CARA individuals are collectively EU

J Bone

Risk-sharing CARA individuals are collectively EU

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper analyses the agreed choices, from uncertain financial prospects, of a group of individuals. The group's agreed choices will conform to Expected Utility theory, if each individual has constant absolute risk-aversion, and if they share risk efficiently. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	311-317
Number of pages	7
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	58
Issue number	3
Publication status	Published - Mar 1998

Keywords

bargaining
risk-sharing
(constant absolute) risk-aversion

Cite this

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title = "Risk-sharing CARA individuals are collectively EU",

abstract = "This paper analyses the agreed choices, from uncertain financial prospects, of a group of individuals. The group's agreed choices will conform to Expected Utility theory, if each individual has constant absolute risk-aversion, and if they share risk efficiently. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science S.A.",

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KW - (constant absolute) risk-aversion

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