Scientists Are Epistemic Consequentialists about Imagination

Mike Stuart

doi:10.1017/psa.2022.31

Scientists Are Epistemic Consequentialists about Imagination

Mike Stuart

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Scientists imagine for epistemic reasons, and these imaginings can be better or worse. But what does it mean for an imagining to be epistemically better or worse? There are at least three metaepistemological frameworks that offer different answers to this question: epistemological consequentialism, deontic epistemology, and virtue epistemology. This paper presents empirical evidence that scientists adopt each of these different epistemic frameworks with respect to imagination, but argues that the way they do this is best explained if scientists are fundamentally epistemic consequentialists about imagination.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	518-538
Number of pages	21
Journal	Philosophy of Science
Volume	90
Issue number	3
Early online date	25 May 2022
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2022.31
Publication status	Published - 1 Jul 2023

Bibliographical note

Access to Document

10.1017/psa.2022.31Licence: CC BY

Scientists Are Epistemic Consequentialists about Imagination
© The Author(s), 2022
Final published version, 256 KBLicence: CC BY

Cite this

@article{d8063b3e0cce426fb086ad88fc54c5e6,

title = "Scientists Are Epistemic Consequentialists about Imagination",

abstract = "Scientists imagine for epistemic reasons, and these imaginings can be better or worse. But what does it mean for an imagining to be epistemically better or worse? There are at least three metaepistemological frameworks that offer different answers to this question: epistemological consequentialism, deontic epistemology, and virtue epistemology. This paper presents empirical evidence that scientists adopt each of these different epistemic frameworks with respect to imagination, but argues that the way they do this is best explained if scientists are fundamentally epistemic consequentialists about imagination.",

author = "Mike Stuart",

note = "{\textcopyright} The Author(s), 2022.",

year = "2023",

month = jul,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1017/psa.2022.31",

language = "English",

volume = "90",

pages = "518--538",

journal = "Philosophy of Science",

issn = "0031-8248",

publisher = "Cambridge University Press",

number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Scientists Are Epistemic Consequentialists about Imagination

AU - Stuart, Mike

PY - 2023/7/1

Y1 - 2023/7/1

N2 - Scientists imagine for epistemic reasons, and these imaginings can be better or worse. But what does it mean for an imagining to be epistemically better or worse? There are at least three metaepistemological frameworks that offer different answers to this question: epistemological consequentialism, deontic epistemology, and virtue epistemology. This paper presents empirical evidence that scientists adopt each of these different epistemic frameworks with respect to imagination, but argues that the way they do this is best explained if scientists are fundamentally epistemic consequentialists about imagination.

AB - Scientists imagine for epistemic reasons, and these imaginings can be better or worse. But what does it mean for an imagining to be epistemically better or worse? There are at least three metaepistemological frameworks that offer different answers to this question: epistemological consequentialism, deontic epistemology, and virtue epistemology. This paper presents empirical evidence that scientists adopt each of these different epistemic frameworks with respect to imagination, but argues that the way they do this is best explained if scientists are fundamentally epistemic consequentialists about imagination.

U2 - 10.1017/psa.2022.31

DO - 10.1017/psa.2022.31

M3 - Article

SN - 0031-8248

VL - 90

SP - 518

EP - 538

JO - Philosophy of Science

JF - Philosophy of Science

IS - 3

ER -