Scientists Are Epistemic Consequentialists about Imagination

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Scientists imagine for epistemic reasons, and these imaginings can be better or worse. But what does it mean for an imagining to be epistemically better or worse? There are at least three metaepistemological frameworks that offer different answers to this question: epistemological consequentialism, deontic epistemology, and virtue epistemology. This paper presents empirical evidence that scientists adopt each of these different epistemic frameworks with respect to imagination, but argues that the way they do this is best explained if scientists are fundamentally epistemic consequentialists about imagination.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)518-538
Number of pages21
JournalPhilosophy of Science
Issue number3
Early online date25 May 2022
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jul 2023

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© The Author(s), 2022.

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