Self-denial and the role of intentions in the attribution of agency

Catherine Preston; Roger Newport

doi:10.1016/j.concog.2010.04.005

Self-denial and the role of intentions in the attribution of agency

Catherine Preston, Roger Newport

Psychology

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

The ability to distinguish between our own actions and those of an external agent is a fundamental component of normal human social interaction. Both low- and high-level mechanisms are thought to contribute to the sense of movement agency, but the contribution of each is yet to be fully understood. By applying small and incremental perturbations to realistic visual feedback of the limb, the influence of high-level action intentions and low-level motor predictive mechanisms were dissociated in two experiments. In the first, participants were induced to claim agency over movements that were subject to large perturbations and to deny agency over self-produced unperturbed movements despite the application of motor corrections by low-level mechanisms. A control experiment confirmed that if reaches met with their intended goal then they were more likely to be attributed to the agent, regardless of the discrepancy between the actual and seen positions of the limb.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	986-998
Number of pages	13
Journal	Consciousness and cognition
Volume	19
Issue number	4
Early online date	10 May 2010
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2010.04.005
Publication status	Published - Dec 2010

Bibliographical note

Keywords

Adult
Awareness
Denial (Psychology)
Female
Functional Laterality
Humans
Intention
Internal-External Control
Kinesthesis
Male
Orientation
Proprioception
Psychomotor Performance
Software
User-Computer Interface
Young Adult

Access to Document

10.1016/j.concog.2010.04.005

Cite this

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title = "Self-denial and the role of intentions in the attribution of agency",

abstract = "The ability to distinguish between our own actions and those of an external agent is a fundamental component of normal human social interaction. Both low- and high-level mechanisms are thought to contribute to the sense of movement agency, but the contribution of each is yet to be fully understood. By applying small and incremental perturbations to realistic visual feedback of the limb, the influence of high-level action intentions and low-level motor predictive mechanisms were dissociated in two experiments. In the first, participants were induced to claim agency over movements that were subject to large perturbations and to deny agency over self-produced unperturbed movements despite the application of motor corrections by low-level mechanisms. A control experiment confirmed that if reaches met with their intended goal then they were more likely to be attributed to the agent, regardless of the discrepancy between the actual and seen positions of the limb.",

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KW - Functional Laterality

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KW - Intention

KW - Internal-External Control

KW - Kinesthesis

KW - Male

KW - Orientation

KW - Proprioception

KW - Psychomotor Performance

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