Setting an exam as an information design problem

Makoto Shimoji

doi:10.1111/ijet.12368

Setting an exam as an information design problem

Makoto Shimoji

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We take a teacher's exam-setting task as an information design problem. Specifically, the teacher chooses a conditional distribution of grades given students' types. After observing their exam results, each student updates her belief regarding her type via Bayes' rule and chooses an action. Students' reactions to the same exam result could be different, depending on their heterogeneous prior beliefs. The teacher's objective is to persuade students to take a certain action (e.g., applying to universities), which some may not choose without an exam. The teacher adopts different grade distributions, depending on the teacher's and the students' heterogeneous prior beliefs.

Original language	English
Number of pages	21
Journal	International Journal of Economic Theory
Early online date	30 Dec 2022
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12368
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - 30 Dec 2022

Bibliographical note

Access to Document

10.1111/ijet.12368Licence: CC BY

Int J of Economic Theory - 2022 - Shimoji - Setting an exam as an information design problem
© 2022 The Authors
Final published version, 1.61 MBLicence: CC BY

Cite this

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