Should Epistemic Injustices be Redressed by the 'Corrective Virtues'?

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Publication details

Title of host publication Justice (the Virtues)
DateAccepted/In press - 1 Apr 2017
DatePublished (current) - 4 Sep 2018
Pages209–236
Number of pages27
PublisherOxford University Press
Place of PublicationNew York
EditorsMark LeBar
Original languageEnglish
ISBN (Print)0190631740

Abstract

Miranda Fricker has suggested that issues in the theory of justice should be extended into epistemology. This paper examines her claim that we sometimes fail to take the testimony of others seriously because of identity prejudice and her claim that people may be denied the interpretative resources to understand the wrongs done to them. Fricker's individualistic focus has drawn criticism; in this paper I develop an independent account of epistemic injustice, its connection to domination, and whether it ought to receive an individualistic or a social explanation. Epistemic injustice may well be within the scope of informal norms and not directly within the ambit of the state. But our ideals of democratic citizenship are not restricted to this narrow scope, either, and that is a clue to the correct way to resolve the issue of whether or not epistemic injustice is to be corrected by individual virtue alone.

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