Abstract
Properties such as sweetness and saltiness are described as gustatory
properties: properties that can only be tasted. However, we also think and talk of these
qualities as smelled. One seemingly plausible way out of this contradiction is to argue
that to ‘smell’ gustatory properties is to be subject to a form of synaesthesia, in which
olfactory experiences reliably generate gustatory illusions or hallucinations. I argue,
in contrast, that these properties are not proprietary to taste, because they can both
figure in the content of olfactory experience and be olfactorily perceived.
properties: properties that can only be tasted. However, we also think and talk of these
qualities as smelled. One seemingly plausible way out of this contradiction is to argue
that to ‘smell’ gustatory properties is to be subject to a form of synaesthesia, in which
olfactory experiences reliably generate gustatory illusions or hallucinations. I argue,
in contrast, that these properties are not proprietary to taste, because they can both
figure in the content of olfactory experience and be olfactorily perceived.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Theoretical Perspectives on Smell |
| Editors | Andreas Keller, Ben Young |
| Publisher | Routledge |
| ISBN (Print) | 9781032075884 |
| Publication status | Published - 2022 |