Social spending targets in IMF concessional lending: US domestic politics and the institutional foundations of rapid operational change

TY - JOUR

T1 - Social spending targets in IMF concessional lending

T2 - US domestic politics and the institutional foundations of rapid operational change

AU - Clegg, Liam

N1 - This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details

PY - 2014/3/1

Y1 - 2014/3/1

N2 - This paper contributes to the literature on the mechanics of change in global economic governance. By synthesising an empirically driven case study with conceptual insights from the existing literature, I highlight three intervening variables that enabled the Legislative Mandates passed by US Congress in 2009 on the use of social-spending targets (education and health expenditure ring fences) in IMF concessional lending to be rapidly translated into operational change. The intervening variables that stood between US domestic action and rapid operational change are: first, the existence of effective enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance from the US Executive Director with the Mandate; second, preference congruence between other primary principals and the content of the Mandate, and; third, the existence of effective enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance from IMF staff with principals’ collectively-sanctioned goal. The outcome observed – the near universal incorporation of social-spending targets into concessional lending arrangements – adds credence to calls for further empirical work to assess the extent of a post-Washington Consensus transition at the IMF.

AB - This paper contributes to the literature on the mechanics of change in global economic governance. By synthesising an empirically driven case study with conceptual insights from the existing literature, I highlight three intervening variables that enabled the Legislative Mandates passed by US Congress in 2009 on the use of social-spending targets (education and health expenditure ring fences) in IMF concessional lending to be rapidly translated into operational change. The intervening variables that stood between US domestic action and rapid operational change are: first, the existence of effective enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance from the US Executive Director with the Mandate; second, preference congruence between other primary principals and the content of the Mandate, and; third, the existence of effective enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance from IMF staff with principals’ collectively-sanctioned goal. The outcome observed – the near universal incorporation of social-spending targets into concessional lending arrangements – adds credence to calls for further empirical work to assess the extent of a post-Washington Consensus transition at the IMF.

U2 - 10.1080/09692290.2013.833958

DO - 10.1080/09692290.2013.833958

M3 - Article

SN - 0969-2290

VL - 21

SP - 735

EP - 763

JO - REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

JF - REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

IS - 3

ER -