Specifying information-flow controls

H Chivers; J Jacob

Specifying information-flow controls

H Chivers, J Jacob

Computer Science

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

The core problem in risk analysis - determining exploitable paths between attackers and system assets is essentially a problem of determining information flow. It is relatively straightforward to interpret design models for service-based distributed systems in information-flow terms, but the analysis results must be integrated into the system engineering process, and any resulting security controls must be meaningful to system practitioners as well as security analysts. The work reported here addresses these practical problems; it shows that information flow analysis can be integrated into the requirements traceability process, ensuring that security controls are specific about the properties they require. Communication between information-analyst and system practitioner is also addressed by tuning the analysis to reflect the exploitability of threat paths, and by defining security controls as patterns of information-flow constraints, rather than single predicates.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	25th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops, Proceedings
Place of Publication	LOS ALAMITOS
Publisher	IEEE Computer Society
Pages	114-120
Number of pages	7
ISBN (Print)	0-7695-2328-5
Publication status	Published - 2005
Event	25th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems - Columbus Duration: 6 Jun 2005 → 10 Jun 2005

Conference

Conference	25th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
City	Columbus
Period	6/06/05 → 10/06/05

Cite this

@inproceedings{f30cd46091964d509415527e885c5160,

title = "Specifying information-flow controls",

abstract = "The core problem in risk analysis - determining exploitable paths between attackers and system assets is essentially a problem of determining information flow. It is relatively straightforward to interpret design models for service-based distributed systems in information-flow terms, but the analysis results must be integrated into the system engineering process, and any resulting security controls must be meaningful to system practitioners as well as security analysts. The work reported here addresses these practical problems; it shows that information flow analysis can be integrated into the requirements traceability process, ensuring that security controls are specific about the properties they require. Communication between information-analyst and system practitioner is also addressed by tuning the analysis to reflect the exploitability of threat paths, and by defining security controls as patterns of information-flow constraints, rather than single predicates.",

author = "H Chivers and J Jacob",

year = "2005",

language = "English",

isbn = "0-7695-2328-5",

pages = "114--120",

booktitle = "25th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops, Proceedings",

publisher = "IEEE Computer Society",

address = "United States",

note = "25th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems ; Conference date: 06-06-2005 Through 10-06-2005",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Specifying information-flow controls

AU - Chivers, H

AU - Jacob, J

PY - 2005

Y1 - 2005

N2 - The core problem in risk analysis - determining exploitable paths between attackers and system assets is essentially a problem of determining information flow. It is relatively straightforward to interpret design models for service-based distributed systems in information-flow terms, but the analysis results must be integrated into the system engineering process, and any resulting security controls must be meaningful to system practitioners as well as security analysts. The work reported here addresses these practical problems; it shows that information flow analysis can be integrated into the requirements traceability process, ensuring that security controls are specific about the properties they require. Communication between information-analyst and system practitioner is also addressed by tuning the analysis to reflect the exploitability of threat paths, and by defining security controls as patterns of information-flow constraints, rather than single predicates.

AB - The core problem in risk analysis - determining exploitable paths between attackers and system assets is essentially a problem of determining information flow. It is relatively straightforward to interpret design models for service-based distributed systems in information-flow terms, but the analysis results must be integrated into the system engineering process, and any resulting security controls must be meaningful to system practitioners as well as security analysts. The work reported here addresses these practical problems; it shows that information flow analysis can be integrated into the requirements traceability process, ensuring that security controls are specific about the properties they require. Communication between information-analyst and system practitioner is also addressed by tuning the analysis to reflect the exploitability of threat paths, and by defining security controls as patterns of information-flow constraints, rather than single predicates.

M3 - Conference contribution

SN - 0-7695-2328-5

SP - 114

EP - 120

BT - 25th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops, Proceedings

PB - IEEE Computer Society

CY - LOS ALAMITOS

T2 - 25th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems

Y2 - 6 June 2005 through 10 June 2005

ER -