STABILITY OF THE CORE IN A CLASS OF NTU GAMES: A CHARACTERIZATION

Anindya Bhattacharya; Amit Biswas

doi:10.1142/S0219198902000628

STABILITY OF THE CORE IN A CLASS OF NTU GAMES: A CHARACTERIZATION

Anindya Bhattacharya, Amit Biswas

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

The core and the stable set are possibly the two most crucially important solution concepts for cooperative games. The relation between the two has been investigated in the context of symmetric transferable utility games and this has been related to the notion of large core. In this paper the relation between the von-Neumann–Morgenstern stability of the core and the largeness of it is investigated in the case of non-transferable utility (NTU) games. The main findings are that under certain regularity conditions, if the core of an NTU game is large then it is a stable set and for symmetric NTU games the core is a stable set if and only if it is large.

Original language	English
Journal	International Game Theory Review
Volume	4
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198902000628
Publication status	Published - 2002

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10.1142/S0219198902000628

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title = "STABILITY OF THE CORE IN A CLASS OF NTU GAMES: A CHARACTERIZATION",

abstract = "The core and the stable set are possibly the two most crucially important solution concepts for cooperative games. The relation between the two has been investigated in the context of symmetric transferable utility games and this has been related to the notion of large core. In this paper the relation between the von-Neumann–Morgenstern stability of the core and the largeness of it is investigated in the case of non-transferable utility (NTU) games. The main findings are that under certain regularity conditions, if the core of an NTU game is large then it is a stable set and for symmetric NTU games the core is a stable set if and only if it is large.",

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AB - The core and the stable set are possibly the two most crucially important solution concepts for cooperative games. The relation between the two has been investigated in the context of symmetric transferable utility games and this has been related to the notion of large core. In this paper the relation between the von-Neumann–Morgenstern stability of the core and the largeness of it is investigated in the case of non-transferable utility (NTU) games. The main findings are that under certain regularity conditions, if the core of an NTU game is large then it is a stable set and for symmetric NTU games the core is a stable set if and only if it is large.

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DO - 10.1142/S0219198902000628

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