Abstract
We study social learning from actions and outcomes. Agents learn about future returns through privately observed signals, others' investment decisions and public experimentation outcomes when returns are realized. We characterize symmetric equilibria, and relate the extent of strategic delay of investments in equilibrium to the primitives of the information structure. Agents invest without delay in equilibrium when the most optimistic interim belief exceeds a threshold. Otherwise, delay in investments induces a learning feedback that may either raise or depress beliefs and investment choices. We show that, although ours is a strategic-experimentation game of pure informational externalities, private information may increase ex-ante welfare.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 105523 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
| Volume | 204 |
| Early online date | 8 Aug 2022 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Sept 2022 |
Keywords
- Experimentation
- Investment timing
- Signaling
- Social learning
- Strategic delay