Strong, bold, and kind: Self-control and cooperation in social dilemmas

TY - JOUR

T1 - Strong, bold, and kind

T2 - Self-control and cooperation in social dilemmas

AU - Kocher, Martin G.

AU - Martinsson, Peter

AU - Myrseth, Kristian Ove R.

AU - Wollbrant, Conny E.

PY - 2017/3

Y1 - 2017/3

N2 - We develop a model that relates self-control to cooperation patterns in social dilemmas, and we test the model in a laboratory public goods experiment. As predicted, we find a robust association between stronger self-control and higher levels of cooperation, and the association is at its strongest when the decision maker’s risk aversion is low and the cooperation levels of others high. We interpret the pattern as evidence for the notion that individuals may experience an impulse to act in self-interest—and that cooperative behavior benefits from self-control. Free-riders differ from other contributor types only in their tendency not to have identified a self-control conflict in the first place.

AB - We develop a model that relates self-control to cooperation patterns in social dilemmas, and we test the model in a laboratory public goods experiment. As predicted, we find a robust association between stronger self-control and higher levels of cooperation, and the association is at its strongest when the decision maker’s risk aversion is low and the cooperation levels of others high. We interpret the pattern as evidence for the notion that individuals may experience an impulse to act in self-interest—and that cooperative behavior benefits from self-control. Free-riders differ from other contributor types only in their tendency not to have identified a self-control conflict in the first place.

KW - Cooperation

KW - Experiment

KW - Public good

KW - Risk

KW - Self-control

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84955618177&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s10683-015-9475-7

DO - 10.1007/s10683-015-9475-7

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84955618177

SN - 1386-4157

VL - 20

SP - 44

EP - 69

JO - Experimental Economics

JF - Experimental Economics

IS - 1

ER -