The Comparative Political Economy of Basel III in Europe

Lucia Quaglia, David Howarth

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


The Basel III Accord was the centrepiece of the international regulatory response to the global financial crisis, setting new capital requirements for internationally active banks. This paper explains the divergent preferences on Basel III of national regulators in three countries that approximate what are frequently presented as distinct varieties of capitalism in Europe — Germany, the United Kingdom and France. It is argued that national regulators setting post crisis capital requirements had to reconcile three inter-related and potentially conflicting objectives: banking sector stability, the competitiveness of national banks and short to medium term economic growth. The different national preferences on Basel III reflected how different national regulators defined and pursued these objectives, which in turn reflected the structure of national banking systems — specifically, systemic patterns of bank capital and bank-industry ties.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)205-214
Number of pages10
JournalPolicy and Society
Issue number3
Early online date3 Mar 2017
Publication statusPublished - 2017

Bibliographical note

© 2016 Policy and Society Associates (APSS). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details.


  • Banking systems
  • Capitalism
  • Finance
  • Regulation
  • Varieties of

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