The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games

Y. Ju; P. Ruys; P. Borm

doi:10.1007/s00355-006-0192-1

The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games

Y. Ju, P. Ruys, P. Borm

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

To generalize the standard solution for 2-person TU games into n-person cases, this paper introduces a recursive two-sided negotiation process to establish cooperation between all players. This leads to a new solution concept for cooperative games: the consensus value. An explicit comparison with the Shapley value is provided, also at the axiomatic level. Moreover, a class of possible generalizations of the consensus value is introduced and axiomatized with the Shapley value at one end and the equal surplus solution at the other. Finally, we discuss a non-cooperative mechanism which implements the consensus value.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	685-703
Number of pages	18
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	28
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0192-1
Publication status	Published - Jun 2007

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10.1007/s00355-006-0192-1

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0192-1

Cite this

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title = "The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games",

abstract = "To generalize the standard solution for 2-person TU games into n-person cases, this paper introduces a recursive two-sided negotiation process to establish cooperation between all players. This leads to a new solution concept for cooperative games: the consensus value. An explicit comparison with the Shapley value is provided, also at the axiomatic level. Moreover, a class of possible generalizations of the consensus value is introduced and axiomatized with the Shapley value at one end and the equal surplus solution at the other. Finally, we discuss a non-cooperative mechanism which implements the consensus value.",

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AB - To generalize the standard solution for 2-person TU games into n-person cases, this paper introduces a recursive two-sided negotiation process to establish cooperation between all players. This leads to a new solution concept for cooperative games: the consensus value. An explicit comparison with the Shapley value is provided, also at the axiomatic level. Moreover, a class of possible generalizations of the consensus value is introduced and axiomatized with the Shapley value at one end and the equal surplus solution at the other. Finally, we discuss a non-cooperative mechanism which implements the consensus value.

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DO - 10.1007/s00355-006-0192-1

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