The Consensus Value for Games in Partition Function Form

Yuan Ju

doi:10.1142/S0219198907001515

The Consensus Value for Games in Partition Function Form

Yuan Ju

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper studies a procedural and axiomatic extension of the consensus value [cf. Ju et al. (2007)] to the class of partition function form games. This value is characterized as the unique function that satisfies efficiency, complete symmetry, the quasi-null player property and additivity. By means of the transfer property, a second characterization is provided. Moreover, it is shown that the consensus value satisfies individual rationality under a superadditivity condition, and well balances the tradeoff between coalitional effects and externality effects. In this respect, explicit differences with other solution concepts are indicated.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	437-452
Number of pages	16
Journal	International Game Theory Review
Volume	9
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198907001515
Publication status	Published - Sept 2007

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10.1142/S0219198907001515

Cite this

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AB - This paper studies a procedural and axiomatic extension of the consensus value [cf. Ju et al. (2007)] to the class of partition function form games. This value is characterized as the unique function that satisfies efficiency, complete symmetry, the quasi-null player property and additivity. By means of the transfer property, a second characterization is provided. Moreover, it is shown that the consensus value satisfies individual rationality under a superadditivity condition, and well balances the tradeoff between coalitional effects and externality effects. In this respect, explicit differences with other solution concepts are indicated.

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