The Consensus Value for Games in Partition Function Form

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JournalInternational Game Theory Review
DatePublished - Sep 2007
Issue number3
Volume9
Number of pages16
Pages (from-to)437-452
Original languageEnglish

Abstract

This paper studies a procedural and axiomatic extension of the consensus value [cf. Ju et al. (2007)] to the class of partition function form games. This value is characterized as the unique function that satisfies efficiency, complete symmetry, the quasi-null player property and additivity. By means of the transfer property, a second characterization is provided. Moreover, it is shown that the consensus value satisfies individual rationality under a superadditivity condition, and well balances the tradeoff between coalitional effects and externality effects. In this respect, explicit differences with other solution concepts are indicated.

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