Abstract
Do financial crises promote or hamper transatlantic regulatory cooperation in banking? This article argues that financial crises have an impact upon the alignment of regulatory preferences of the United States (US) and the European Union (EU), causing an 'ebb and flow' in transatlantic cooperation. When EU-US preferences are broadly aligned in periods of financial stability, transatlantic regulatory cooperation is intense. It is relatively easy for the EU and US to agree on market-friendly regulation promoted by banks. When preferences are different, especially in the context and aftermath of the exogenous shock of financial crises, transatlantic cooperation is more problematic because crises re-assert the importance of nationally embedded patterns of market organisation.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 21-33 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| Journal | Journal of Banking Regulation |
| Volume | 17 |
| Issue number | 1-2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Mar 2016 |
Bibliographical note
© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Ltd 2016. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. Further copying may not be permitted; contact the publisher for details. Embargo period : 12 monthsKeywords
- banks
- Basel III
- capital requirements
- European Union
- financial regulation
- United States