Abstract
In this article, the author characterizes the instability and the essential work of characterizing self-deception. He provides a number of advantages of the approach, including unity where other accounts of unity fail. He also explains the view that self-deception as a kind of theoretical irrationality. He notes that self-deception is often contrasted with wishful thinking and full-blown delusion. The author also explains how appeal to the essential instability of self-deception in attentive consciousness can provide this unity.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 45-71 |
| Number of pages | 27 |
| Journal | Social Theory and Practice |
| Volume | 35 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Publication status | Published - Jan 2009 |
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