The incentive effects of payment by results

M. Miraldo, M. Goddard, P.C. Smith

Research output: Book/ReportCommissioned report


Recently the English NHS has introduced an activity-based payment scheme for secondary care - the Payment by Results (PbR) policy. In this paper we discuss, from an economic perspective, the main intended and unintended incentives created by this policy. We also outline the role of different NHS institutions in monitoring and analysing the impact of PbR and consider the information and data requirements for such tasks.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationYork, UK
PublisherCentre for Health Economics, University of York
Number of pages21
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2006

Publication series

NameCHE Research Paper
PublisherCentre for Health Economics

Bibliographical note

© 2006 the authors. The full text of this report can be viewed free of charge from the Centre for Health Economics web site at:


  • Payment by results
  • Prospective Payment System
  • Incentives

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