The limits of concentrated power: Bureaucratic independence and electricity crises in Rwanda

Benjamin Chemouni; Barnaby Dye

doi:10.1093/afraf/adae003

The limits of concentrated power: Bureaucratic independence and electricity crises in Rwanda

Benjamin Chemouni, Barnaby Dye

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Rwanda is a posterchild of economic success in twenty-first century Africa. Dominant explanations for the country's growth use the political settlements framework, asserting that concentrated political power enabled long-term planning. In contrast, this article uses the case of Rwanda's impressive boom in electricity generation to demonstrate that such concentrated power also distorts policy-making processes, creating a fiscal crisis that jeopardizes Rwanda's economic transformation. Therefore, this article questions a central premise of the political settlements framework. Concentrated political power in Rwanda enabled rapid and ambitious construction of power plants but resulted in an oversupply crisis, plunging the sector into significant debt and raising the cost of electricity. Rwanda's political settlement prevented experts from challenging unrealistic targets set by top politicians, which led to a headlong pursuit of electricity generation capacity. To understand this process, we assert the importance of focusing on the bureaucratic/politician relationship, which we label 'bureaucratic independence', rather than on the oft-used concept of 'bureaucratic autonomy' usually associated with the concentration of political power.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	75-101
Number of pages	27
Journal	AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Volume	123
Issue number	490
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adae003
Publication status	Published - 28 Mar 2024

Bibliographical note

Access to Document

10.1093/afraf/adae003

The limits of concentrated power-ready_for_second_edits v2_Submitted
This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the University’s Research Publications and Open Access policy.
Accepted author manuscript, 235 KBLicence: CC BY

Cite this

@article{43b1f60df1214520a38f0794eaff94ae,

title = "The limits of concentrated power: Bureaucratic independence and electricity crises in Rwanda",

abstract = "Rwanda is a posterchild of economic success in twenty-first century Africa. Dominant explanations for the country's growth use the political settlements framework, asserting that concentrated political power enabled long-term planning. In contrast, this article uses the case of Rwanda's impressive boom in electricity generation to demonstrate that such concentrated power also distorts policy-making processes, creating a fiscal crisis that jeopardizes Rwanda's economic transformation. Therefore, this article questions a central premise of the political settlements framework. Concentrated political power in Rwanda enabled rapid and ambitious construction of power plants but resulted in an oversupply crisis, plunging the sector into significant debt and raising the cost of electricity. Rwanda's political settlement prevented experts from challenging unrealistic targets set by top politicians, which led to a headlong pursuit of electricity generation capacity. To understand this process, we assert the importance of focusing on the bureaucratic/politician relationship, which we label 'bureaucratic independence', rather than on the oft-used concept of 'bureaucratic autonomy' usually associated with the concentration of political power.",

author = "Benjamin Chemouni and Barnaby Dye",

note = "{\textcopyright} 2024 The Author(s). This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the University{\textquoteright}s Research Publications and Open Access policy. ",

year = "2024",

month = mar,

day = "28",

doi = "10.1093/afraf/adae003",

language = "English",

volume = "123",

pages = "75--101",

journal = "AFRICAN AFFAIRS",

issn = "0001-9909",

publisher = "Oxford University Press",

number = "490",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - The limits of concentrated power

T2 - Bureaucratic independence and electricity crises in Rwanda

AU - Chemouni, Benjamin

AU - Dye, Barnaby

PY - 2024/3/28

Y1 - 2024/3/28

N2 - Rwanda is a posterchild of economic success in twenty-first century Africa. Dominant explanations for the country's growth use the political settlements framework, asserting that concentrated political power enabled long-term planning. In contrast, this article uses the case of Rwanda's impressive boom in electricity generation to demonstrate that such concentrated power also distorts policy-making processes, creating a fiscal crisis that jeopardizes Rwanda's economic transformation. Therefore, this article questions a central premise of the political settlements framework. Concentrated political power in Rwanda enabled rapid and ambitious construction of power plants but resulted in an oversupply crisis, plunging the sector into significant debt and raising the cost of electricity. Rwanda's political settlement prevented experts from challenging unrealistic targets set by top politicians, which led to a headlong pursuit of electricity generation capacity. To understand this process, we assert the importance of focusing on the bureaucratic/politician relationship, which we label 'bureaucratic independence', rather than on the oft-used concept of 'bureaucratic autonomy' usually associated with the concentration of political power.

AB - Rwanda is a posterchild of economic success in twenty-first century Africa. Dominant explanations for the country's growth use the political settlements framework, asserting that concentrated political power enabled long-term planning. In contrast, this article uses the case of Rwanda's impressive boom in electricity generation to demonstrate that such concentrated power also distorts policy-making processes, creating a fiscal crisis that jeopardizes Rwanda's economic transformation. Therefore, this article questions a central premise of the political settlements framework. Concentrated political power in Rwanda enabled rapid and ambitious construction of power plants but resulted in an oversupply crisis, plunging the sector into significant debt and raising the cost of electricity. Rwanda's political settlement prevented experts from challenging unrealistic targets set by top politicians, which led to a headlong pursuit of electricity generation capacity. To understand this process, we assert the importance of focusing on the bureaucratic/politician relationship, which we label 'bureaucratic independence', rather than on the oft-used concept of 'bureaucratic autonomy' usually associated with the concentration of political power.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85197311370&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1093/afraf/adae003

DO - 10.1093/afraf/adae003

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85197311370

SN - 0001-9909

VL - 123

SP - 75

EP - 101

JO - AFRICAN AFFAIRS

JF - AFRICAN AFFAIRS

IS - 490

ER -

The limits of concentrated power: Bureaucratic independence and electricity crises in Rwanda

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Access to Document

Other files and links

Cite this