The Mind-Independence of Colour

K. Allen

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0378.2007.00258.x

The Mind-Independence of Colour

K. Allen

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

The view that the mind-dependence of colour is implicit in our ordinary thinking has a distinguished history. With its origins in Berkeley, the view has proved especially popular amongst so-called ‘Oxford’ philosophers, proponents including Cook Wilson (1904: 773-4), Pritchard (1909: 86-7), Ryle (1949: 209), Kneale (1950: 123) and McDowell (1985: 112). Gareth Evans’s discussion of secondary qualities in “Things Without the Mind” is representative of this tradition. It is his version of the view that I consider in this paper.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	137-158
Number of pages	21
Journal	European Journal of Philosophy
Volume	15
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2007.00258.x
Publication status	Published - Aug 2007

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10.1111/j.1468-0378.2007.00258.x

http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2007.00258.x

Cite this

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title = "The Mind-Independence of Colour",

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