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The Precarious Rationality of International Law: Critiquing the International Rule of Recognition

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The Precarious Rationality of International Law : Critiquing the International Rule of Recognition. / Green, Alex.

In: German Law Journal, 24.05.2021.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Green, A 2021, 'The Precarious Rationality of International Law: Critiquing the International Rule of Recognition', German Law Journal.

APA

Green, A. (Accepted/In press). The Precarious Rationality of International Law: Critiquing the International Rule of Recognition. German Law Journal.

Vancouver

Green A. The Precarious Rationality of International Law: Critiquing the International Rule of Recognition. German Law Journal. 2021 May 24.

Author

Green, Alex. / The Precarious Rationality of International Law : Critiquing the International Rule of Recognition. In: German Law Journal. 2021.

Bibtex - Download

@article{4c8697c557404af9aa7d50fca8855c98,
title = "The Precarious Rationality of International Law: Critiquing the International Rule of Recognition",
abstract = "Some scholars assume that the content and validity of international legal norms turns upon the existence of convergent attitudes and behaviours of state representatives and other {\textquoteleft}international legal officials{\textquoteright}. By converging upon the criteria for what counts as a {\textquoteleft}formal source{\textquoteright} of international law and what does not, such officials provide a {\textquoteleft}rule of recognition{\textquoteright} in relation to which the normative content of the international legal system is determined. In this paper I present two theoretical problems with this view, arguing that, depending on exactly what role this rule is intended to fulfil within international legal theory, it is either metaphysically insupportable or fundamentally at odds with the disagreements that persist in relation to the formal sources of international law. Both problems risk undermining the rationality of international legal argumentation and any reliance upon the existence of an international rule of recognition should be eschewed as a result.",
author = "Alex Green",
year = "2021",
month = may,
day = "24",
language = "English",
journal = "German Law Journal",
issn = "2071-8322",
publisher = "Cambridge University Press",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) - Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Precarious Rationality of International Law

T2 - Critiquing the International Rule of Recognition

AU - Green, Alex

PY - 2021/5/24

Y1 - 2021/5/24

N2 - Some scholars assume that the content and validity of international legal norms turns upon the existence of convergent attitudes and behaviours of state representatives and other ‘international legal officials’. By converging upon the criteria for what counts as a ‘formal source’ of international law and what does not, such officials provide a ‘rule of recognition’ in relation to which the normative content of the international legal system is determined. In this paper I present two theoretical problems with this view, arguing that, depending on exactly what role this rule is intended to fulfil within international legal theory, it is either metaphysically insupportable or fundamentally at odds with the disagreements that persist in relation to the formal sources of international law. Both problems risk undermining the rationality of international legal argumentation and any reliance upon the existence of an international rule of recognition should be eschewed as a result.

AB - Some scholars assume that the content and validity of international legal norms turns upon the existence of convergent attitudes and behaviours of state representatives and other ‘international legal officials’. By converging upon the criteria for what counts as a ‘formal source’ of international law and what does not, such officials provide a ‘rule of recognition’ in relation to which the normative content of the international legal system is determined. In this paper I present two theoretical problems with this view, arguing that, depending on exactly what role this rule is intended to fulfil within international legal theory, it is either metaphysically insupportable or fundamentally at odds with the disagreements that persist in relation to the formal sources of international law. Both problems risk undermining the rationality of international legal argumentation and any reliance upon the existence of an international rule of recognition should be eschewed as a result.

M3 - Article

JO - German Law Journal

JF - German Law Journal

SN - 2071-8322

ER -