The security implications of the UK quitting the EU: How will Brexit affect EU strategic ambitions and the common security and defence policy?

TY - GEN

T1 - The security implications of the UK quitting the EU: How will Brexit affect EU strategic ambitions and the common security and defence policy?

AU - Sweeney, Simon

PY - 2017/9/6

Y1 - 2017/9/6

N2 - The UK's EU referendum campaign and the Brexit process have been dominated by trade and arguments over Single Market access. The security and defence implications of Brexit have hardly figured before and after triggering TEU Art. 50. This paper argues that defence and security cooperation, including EU Common Security and Defence Policy missions, should not be neglected. EU involvement in security and defence has relied on France and Britain, the Union's major defence spenders, and the only member states capable of power projection. So the implications for the EU Global Strategy and for CSDP of the UK leaving the Union are highly significant. During the referendum campaign, Leave supporters argued that Brexit would not compromise UK security, nor harm the UK contribution to European defence (through NATO). The UK had already cooled towards CSDP. It often seemed a reluctant participant in the European Defence Agency (EDA) and was a sceptical onlooker during the setting up of the European External Action Service (EEAS). Since 2010 UK interest in pan-European security declined, consistent with concerns that EU engagement in defence would compete with or duplicate NATO's contribution.So does Brexit merely confirm a trend? This paper argues that the implications for CSDP are extremely serious, that the EU Global Strategy is even less likely to achieve its (vague) aspirations, and that quitting the Union will damage British security. The UK cannot distance itself from security threats that affect the EU, and these threats require deeper cooperation. Brexit makes this harder.

AB - The UK's EU referendum campaign and the Brexit process have been dominated by trade and arguments over Single Market access. The security and defence implications of Brexit have hardly figured before and after triggering TEU Art. 50. This paper argues that defence and security cooperation, including EU Common Security and Defence Policy missions, should not be neglected. EU involvement in security and defence has relied on France and Britain, the Union's major defence spenders, and the only member states capable of power projection. So the implications for the EU Global Strategy and for CSDP of the UK leaving the Union are highly significant. During the referendum campaign, Leave supporters argued that Brexit would not compromise UK security, nor harm the UK contribution to European defence (through NATO). The UK had already cooled towards CSDP. It often seemed a reluctant participant in the European Defence Agency (EDA) and was a sceptical onlooker during the setting up of the European External Action Service (EEAS). Since 2010 UK interest in pan-European security declined, consistent with concerns that EU engagement in defence would compete with or duplicate NATO's contribution.So does Brexit merely confirm a trend? This paper argues that the implications for CSDP are extremely serious, that the EU Global Strategy is even less likely to achieve its (vague) aspirations, and that quitting the Union will damage British security. The UK cannot distance itself from security threats that affect the EU, and these threats require deeper cooperation. Brexit makes this harder.

M3 - Conference contribution

BT - UACES Annual Conference, Krakow, Poland

ER -