The Self as the Locus of Morality: A Comparison between Charles Taylor and George Herbert Mead’s Theories of the Moral Constitution of the Self

Owen Abbott

doi:10.1111/jtsb.12258

The Self as the Locus of Morality: A Comparison between Charles Taylor and George Herbert Mead’s Theories of the Moral Constitution of the Self

Owen Abbott

Sociology

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper provides a critical comparison of two leading exponents of the relationship between morality and selfhood: Charles Taylor and George Herbert Mead. Specifically, it seeks to provide an assessment of the contribution each approach is able to make to a social theory of morality that has the self at its heart. Ultimately, it is argued that Taylor’s phenomenological account neglects the significance of interaction and social relations in his conceptualisation of the relationship between morality and self, which undermines the capacity of his framework to explain how moral understandings and dialogic moral subjectivity develop in a world of shared meaning. I then argue that Mead’s pragmatist interactionist approach overcomes many of the flaws in Taylor’s framework, and offers a grounded conceptualisation of the relationship between self and morality that is able to provide a basis for a properly social account of moral subjectivity.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	516-533
Number of pages	18
Journal	Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour
Volume	50
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.12258
Publication status	Published - 21 Sept 2020

Bibliographical note

Keywords

Charles Taylor
George Herbert Mead
moral self
moral subjectivity
morality
social theory

Access to Document

10.1111/jtsb.12258

Cite this

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title = "The Self as the Locus of Morality: A Comparison between Charles Taylor and George Herbert Mead{\textquoteright}s Theories of the Moral Constitution of the Self",

abstract = "This paper provides a critical comparison of two leading exponents of the relationship between morality and selfhood: Charles Taylor and George Herbert Mead. Specifically, it seeks to provide an assessment of the contribution each approach is able to make to a social theory of morality that has the self at its heart. Ultimately, it is argued that Taylor{\textquoteright}s phenomenological account neglects the significance of interaction and social relations in his conceptualisation of the relationship between morality and self, which undermines the capacity of his framework to explain how moral understandings and dialogic moral subjectivity develop in a world of shared meaning. I then argue that Mead{\textquoteright}s pragmatist interactionist approach overcomes many of the flaws in Taylor{\textquoteright}s framework, and offers a grounded conceptualisation of the relationship between self and morality that is able to provide a basis for a properly social account of moral subjectivity.",

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