According to Honderich, consciousness, or more precisely, perceptual consciousness is the existence of a world. In the first and section sections of the paper, I consider the motivations for adopting this theory rather than representationalism or an ambitious development of disjunctivism. In the third section, I consider whether Honderich’s theory performs well with regard to what he considers a crucial feature of perceptual states, namely that they have causal consequences for our behaviour. In the fourth section, I discuss Honderich’s approach to reflective consciousness and argue that it contains an important insight that representationalists should use to answer a substantial objection against their position – one pressed by Honderich. I close with a brief discussion of the impact of hallucinations on Honderich’s theory.
|Number of pages||11|
|Journal||Journal of Consciousness Studies|
|Publication status||Published - Jul 2006|