The transparent failure of norms to keep up standards of belief

Ema Louise Sullivan-Bissett; Paul Jonathan Pitt Noordhof

doi:10.1007/s11098-019-01242-y

The transparent failure of norms to keep up standards of belief

Ema Louise Sullivan-Bissett, Paul Jonathan Pitt Noordhof

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We argue that the most plausible characterisation of the norm of truth—it is permissible to believe that p if and only if p is true—is unable to explain Transparency in doxastic deliberation, a task for which it is claimed to be equipped. In addition, the failure of the norm to do this work undermines the most plausible account of how the norm guides belief formation at all. Those attracted to normativism about belief for its perceived explanatory credentials had better look elsewhere.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1-15
Number of pages	15
Journal	Philosophical Studies
Early online date	14 Feb 2019
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01242-y
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - 14 Feb 2019

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10.1007/s11098-019-01242-y

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