Abstract
Derek Parfit’s argument against the platitude that identity is what matters in survival does not work given his intended reading of the platitude, namely, that what matters in survival to some future time is being identical with someone who is alive at that time. I develop Parfit’s argument so that it works against the platitude on the intended reading.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 745-750 |
Number of pages | 6 |
Journal | Philosophical Studies |
Volume | 175 |
Issue number | 3 |
Early online date | 8 Mar 2017 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Mar 2018 |
Bibliographical note
© The Author(s) 2017.Keywords
- Division
- Fission
- Indeterminacy
- Personal identity
- Survival
- What matters