The Unimportance of Being Any Future Person

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Derek Parfit’s argument against the platitude that identity is what matters in survival does not work given his intended reading of the platitude, namely, that what matters in survival to some future time is being identical with someone who is alive at that time. I develop Parfit’s argument so that it works against the platitude on the intended reading.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)745-750
Number of pages6
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Issue number3
Early online date8 Mar 2017
Publication statusPublished - 1 Mar 2018

Bibliographical note

© The Author(s) 2017.


  • Division
  • Fission
  • Indeterminacy
  • Personal identity
  • Survival
  • What matters

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