The Unimportance of Being Any Future Person

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JournalPhilosophical Studies
DateAccepted/In press - 26 Feb 2017
DateE-pub ahead of print - 8 Mar 2017
DatePublished (current) - Mar 2018
Number of pages6
Pages (from-to)745-750
Early online date8/03/17
Original languageEnglish

Abstract

Derek Parfit’s argument against the platitude that identity is what matters in survival does not work given his intended reading of the platitude, namely, that what matters in survival to some future time is being identical with someone who is alive at that time. I develop Parfit’s argument so that it works against the platitude on the intended reading.

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© The Author(s) 2017.

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