Three Models of Political Membership: Delineating 'The People in Question'

Alex Green

doi:10.1093/ojls/gqaa040

Three Models of Political Membership: Delineating 'The People in Question'

Alex Green

York Law School

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

In her timely monograph, The People in Question, Jo Shaw provides a much-needed critical comparative review of the complex interactions between citizenship and constitutional law. In this essay, I argue that, despite its emphasis upon citizenship’s essentially contested nature, Shaw’s latest work contains rich moral commitments and an important caution against uncritically eliding ‘full citizenship’ with ‘political membership’ more broadly construed. To establish these claims, I present a tripartite taxonomy of approaches to defining ‘the people’ based, respectively, upon the concepts of status, subjugation, and duty. I claim that Shaw’s incisive analysis demonstrates perfectly why we should avoid placing undue reliance upon ‘status-based’ models of community membership and conclude by advancing an original, alternative, and hybridised model of ‘the people in question’.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	565–583
Number of pages	19
Journal	Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
Volume	41
Issue number	2
Early online date	18 Dec 2020
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqaa040
Publication status	Published - Jul 2021

Keywords

Constitutional Theory
Citizenship
Legal Philosophy
Political Theory
Public International Law

Access to Document

10.1093/ojls/gqaa040

Cite this

@article{b11431ec64fd44f38582c04cba2501f2,

title = "Three Models of Political Membership: Delineating 'The People in Question'",

abstract = "In her timely monograph, The People in Question, Jo Shaw provides a much-needed critical comparative review of the complex interactions between citizenship and constitutional law. In this essay, I argue that, despite its emphasis upon citizenship{\textquoteright}s essentially contested nature, Shaw{\textquoteright}s latest work contains rich moral commitments and an important caution against uncritically eliding {\textquoteleft}full citizenship{\textquoteright} with {\textquoteleft}political membership{\textquoteright} more broadly construed. To establish these claims, I present a tripartite taxonomy of approaches to defining {\textquoteleft}the people{\textquoteright} based, respectively, upon the concepts of status, subjugation, and duty. I claim that Shaw{\textquoteright}s incisive analysis demonstrates perfectly why we should avoid placing undue reliance upon {\textquoteleft}status-based{\textquoteright} models of community membership and conclude by advancing an original, alternative, and hybridised model of {\textquoteleft}the people in question{\textquoteright}.",

keywords = "Constitutional Theory, Citizenship, Legal Philosophy, Political Theory, Public International Law",

author = "Alex Green",

year = "2021",

month = jul,

doi = "10.1093/ojls/gqaa040",

language = "English",

volume = "41",

pages = "565–583",

journal = "Oxford Journal of Legal Studies",

issn = "0143-6503",

publisher = "Oxford University Press",

number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Three Models of Political Membership

T2 - Delineating 'The People in Question'

AU - Green, Alex

PY - 2021/7

Y1 - 2021/7

N2 - In her timely monograph, The People in Question, Jo Shaw provides a much-needed critical comparative review of the complex interactions between citizenship and constitutional law. In this essay, I argue that, despite its emphasis upon citizenship’s essentially contested nature, Shaw’s latest work contains rich moral commitments and an important caution against uncritically eliding ‘full citizenship’ with ‘political membership’ more broadly construed. To establish these claims, I present a tripartite taxonomy of approaches to defining ‘the people’ based, respectively, upon the concepts of status, subjugation, and duty. I claim that Shaw’s incisive analysis demonstrates perfectly why we should avoid placing undue reliance upon ‘status-based’ models of community membership and conclude by advancing an original, alternative, and hybridised model of ‘the people in question’.

AB - In her timely monograph, The People in Question, Jo Shaw provides a much-needed critical comparative review of the complex interactions between citizenship and constitutional law. In this essay, I argue that, despite its emphasis upon citizenship’s essentially contested nature, Shaw’s latest work contains rich moral commitments and an important caution against uncritically eliding ‘full citizenship’ with ‘political membership’ more broadly construed. To establish these claims, I present a tripartite taxonomy of approaches to defining ‘the people’ based, respectively, upon the concepts of status, subjugation, and duty. I claim that Shaw’s incisive analysis demonstrates perfectly why we should avoid placing undue reliance upon ‘status-based’ models of community membership and conclude by advancing an original, alternative, and hybridised model of ‘the people in question’.

KW - Constitutional Theory

KW - Citizenship

KW - Legal Philosophy

KW - Political Theory

KW - Public International Law

U2 - 10.1093/ojls/gqaa040

DO - 10.1093/ojls/gqaa040

M3 - Article

SN - 0143-6503

VL - 41

SP - 565

EP - 583

JO - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies

JF - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies

IS - 2

ER -