Tooley on Backward Causation

Paul Jonathan Pitt Noordhof

Tooley on Backward Causation

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Michael Tooley has argued that, if backward causation (of a certain kind) is possible, then a Stalnaker-Lewis account of the truth conditions of counterfactuals cannot be sound. I explain how his argument overlooks two things: first, that there may be assumed contexts in the assessment of particular counterfactuals and, second, that closeness of possible worlds is relative to the antecedent of a counterfactual. Once these are recognised, there is no threat to the Stalnaker-Lewis account.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	157-162
Number of pages	6
Journal	Analysis
Volume	63
Issue number	2
Publication status	Published - Apr 2003

Cite this

@article{460e753b8ee84a9e952b49f45b89f051,

title = "Tooley on Backward Causation",

abstract = "Michael Tooley has argued that, if backward causation (of a certain kind) is possible, then a Stalnaker-Lewis account of the truth conditions of counterfactuals cannot be sound. I explain how his argument overlooks two things: first, that there may be assumed contexts in the assessment of particular counterfactuals and, second, that closeness of possible worlds is relative to the antecedent of a counterfactual. Once these are recognised, there is no threat to the Stalnaker-Lewis account.",

author = "Noordhof, {Paul Jonathan Pitt}",

year = "2003",

month = apr,

language = "English",

volume = "63",

pages = "157--162",

journal = "Analysis",

issn = "0003-2638",

publisher = "Oxford University Press",

number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Tooley on Backward Causation

AU - Noordhof, Paul Jonathan Pitt

PY - 2003/4

Y1 - 2003/4

N2 - Michael Tooley has argued that, if backward causation (of a certain kind) is possible, then a Stalnaker-Lewis account of the truth conditions of counterfactuals cannot be sound. I explain how his argument overlooks two things: first, that there may be assumed contexts in the assessment of particular counterfactuals and, second, that closeness of possible worlds is relative to the antecedent of a counterfactual. Once these are recognised, there is no threat to the Stalnaker-Lewis account.

AB - Michael Tooley has argued that, if backward causation (of a certain kind) is possible, then a Stalnaker-Lewis account of the truth conditions of counterfactuals cannot be sound. I explain how his argument overlooks two things: first, that there may be assumed contexts in the assessment of particular counterfactuals and, second, that closeness of possible worlds is relative to the antecedent of a counterfactual. Once these are recognised, there is no threat to the Stalnaker-Lewis account.

M3 - Article

SN - 0003-2638

VL - 63

SP - 157

EP - 162

JO - Analysis

JF - Analysis

IS - 2

ER -