Abstract
Contemporary theories of consciousness, although very efficient in postulating testable hypotheses, seem to either neglect its relational aspect or to have a profound difficulty in operationalizing this aspect in a measurable manner. We further argue that the analysis of periodic brain activity is inadequate to reveal consciousness’s subjective facet. This creates an important epistemic gap in the quest for the neural correlates of consciousness. We suggest a possible solution to bridge this gap, by analysing aperiodic brain activity. We further argue for the imperative need to inform neuroscientific theories of consciousness with relevant philosophical endeavours, in an effort to define, and therefore operationalise, consciousness thoroughly.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 1245868 |
Number of pages | 6 |
Journal | Frontiers in human neuroscience |
Volume | 17 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 13 Oct 2023 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:Submission of this manuscript was funded by CITY College, University of York Europe Campus.
Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © 2023 Ladas, Gravalas, Stoneham and Frantzidis.
Keywords
- aperiodic activity
- consciousness
- neural correlates
- philosophy
- relational