Utilitarianism without Moral Aggregation

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Is an outcome where many people are saved and one person dies better than an outcome where the one is saved and the many die? According to the standard utilitarian justification, the former is better because it has a greater sum total of well-being. This justification involves a controversial form of moral aggregation, because it is based on a comparison between aggregates of different people’s well-being. Still, an alternative justification-the Argument for Best Outcomes-does not involve moral aggregation. I extend the Argument for Best Outcomes to show that any utilitarian evaluation can be justified without moral aggregation.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)256-269
Number of pages14
JournalCanadian journal of philosophy
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 7 Oct 2021

Bibliographical note

© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Canadian Journal of Philosophy

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