Voter turnout and intergenerational redistribution

Michael Klien; Mickael Melki; Andrew Christopher Pickering

Voter turnout and intergenerational redistribution

Michael Klien, Mickael Melki, Andrew Christopher Pickering

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Electoral reforms that lead to reduced turnout modify the composition of the electorate, potentially overrepresenting specific interests in policy implementation. Intergenerational redistribution tilts in favor of the elderly when they are sufficiently numerous, but in favor of the young rich otherwise. We exploit a natural experiment provided by the repeal of compulsory voting in Austrian parliamentary elections to study how exogenous turnout decline affects intergenerational redistribution through pro-young public education spending in Austrian municipalities. Empirically, education spending falls when the proportion of elderly voters exceeds 21% of the electorate, but rises when the proportion of elderly voters is below this threshold.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1-23
Number of pages	23
Journal	Journal of comparative economics
Early online date	9 Oct 2020
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - 9 Oct 2020

Bibliographical note

© 2020 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy.

Access to Document

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© 2020 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an author-produced version of the published paper. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy.
Accepted author manuscript, 4.68 MBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147596720300433

Cite this

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title = "Voter turnout and intergenerational redistribution",

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AB - Electoral reforms that lead to reduced turnout modify the composition of the electorate, potentially overrepresenting specific interests in policy implementation. Intergenerational redistribution tilts in favor of the elderly when they are sufficiently numerous, but in favor of the young rich otherwise. We exploit a natural experiment provided by the repeal of compulsory voting in Austrian parliamentary elections to study how exogenous turnout decline affects intergenerational redistribution through pro-young public education spending in Austrian municipalities. Empirically, education spending falls when the proportion of elderly voters exceeds 21% of the electorate, but rises when the proportion of elderly voters is below this threshold.

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