Abstract
One understanding of naturalism about perception allows that results in the sciences bearing on the senses may have an impact upon philosophical theorising on perception. Its opponents reject or, at least, are much more wary about this possibility. I consider two cases: the implications of prediction error theories for naïve realism and the latest empirical research on cross modal illusions, and taste, for the traditional division of the senses into five. Although in neither case are the implications straightforward, I argue that there is a tension in the first case, relating to naïve realism, given the structure of the debate against representationalism, what naïve realists say about hallucination, and assertion of the significant differences between perception and cognition. In the second, the conflict is avoided by recognising distinctive features of how senses are integrated and realised, and a new personal level of explanation.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Purpose and Procedure in the Philosophy of Perception |
| Editors | Heather Logue, Louise Richardson |
| Place of Publication | Oxford |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| Chapter | 10 |
| Pages | 191-214 |
| Number of pages | 24 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780198853534 |
| Publication status | Published - 10 Jun 2021 |