Wading in the Shallows

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (peer-reviewed)peer-review


One understanding of naturalism about perception allows that results in the sciences bearing on the senses may have an impact upon philosophical theorising on perception. Its opponents reject or, at least, are much more wary about this possibility. I consider two cases: the implications of prediction error theories for naïve realism and the latest empirical research on cross modal illusions, and taste, for the traditional division of the senses into five. Although in neither case are the implications straightforward, I argue that there is a tension in the first case, relating to naïve realism, given the structure of the debate against representationalism, what naïve realists say about hallucination, and assertion of the significant differences between perception and cognition. In the second, the conflict is avoided by recognising distinctive features of how senses are integrated and realised, and a new personal level of explanation.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationPurpose and Procedure in the Philosophy of Perception
EditorsHeather Logue, Louise Richardson
Place of PublicationOxford
PublisherOxford University Press
Number of pages24
ISBN (Print)9780198853534
Publication statusPublished - 10 Jun 2021

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