When queueing is better than push and shove

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle



Publication details

JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
DatePublished - Jul 2010
Issue number3
Number of pages22
Pages (from-to)409-430
Original languageEnglish


We address the scheduling problem of reordering an existing queue into its efficient order through trade. To that end, we consider individually rational and balanced budget direct and indirect mechanisms. We show that this class of mechanisms allows us to form efficient queues provided that existing property rights for the service are small enough to enable trade between the agents. In particular, we show on the one hand that no queue under a fully deterministic service schedule such as first-come, first-serve can be dissolved efficiently and meet our requirements. If, on the other hand, the alternative is full service anarchy then every existing queue can be transformed into its efficient order.

    Research areas

  • Scheduling, Queueing, Mechanism design, MECHANISMS, DESIGN

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