Willpower Satisficing

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Satisficing Consequentialism is often rejected as hopeless. Perhaps its greatest problem is that it risks condoning the gratuitous prevention of goodness above the baseline of what qualifies as “good enough”. I propose a radical new willpower-based version of the view that avoids this problem, and that better fits with the motivation of avoiding an excessively demanding conception of morality. I further demonstrate how, by drawing on the resources of an independent theory of blameworthiness, we may obtain a principled specification of what counts as “good enough”.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)251-265
Number of pages15
Issue number2
Early online date27 Jul 2017
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2019

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