Satisficing Consequentialism is often rejected as hopeless. Perhaps its greatest problem is that it risks condoning the gratuitous prevention of goodness above the baseline of what qualifies as “good enough”. I propose a radical new willpower-based version of the view that avoids this problem, and that better fits with the motivation of avoiding an excessively demanding conception of morality. I further demonstrate how, by drawing on the resources of an independent theory of blameworthiness, we may obtain a principled specification of what counts as “good enough”.
|Number of pages||15|
|Early online date||27 Jul 2017|
|Publication status||Published - 1 Jun 2019|
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Richard Yetter Chappell
- Philosophy - Lecturer - Ethics, Former employee